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Abstract: Engaged research emphasizes researcher–stakeholder collaborations as means
of improving the relevance of research outcomes and the chances for science-based
decision-making. Sustainability science, as a form of engaged research, depends on the
collaborative abilities and cooperative tendencies of researchers. We use an economic
experiment to measure cooperation between university faculty, local citizens, and faculty
engaged in a large sustainability science project to test a set of hypotheses: (1) faculty on
the sustainability project will cooperate more with local residents than non-affiliated
faculty, (2) sustainability faculty will have the highest level of internal cooperation of any
group, and (3) that cooperation may vary due to academic training and culture in different
departments amongst sustainability faculty. Our results demonstrate that affiliation with the
sustainability project is not associated with differences in cooperation with local citizens or
with in-group peers, but that disciplinary differences amongst sustainability faculty do
correlate with cooperative tendencies within our sample. We also find that non-affiliated
faculty cooperated less with each other than with faculty affiliated with the sustainability
project. We conclude that economic experiments can be useful in discovering patterns of
prosociality within institutional settings, and list challenges for further applications.
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1. Introduction
Leaders in the emerging field of sustainability science emphasize the importance of forging research
collaborations that span organizational boundaries, disciplinary cultures and involve stakeholders in the
research process as a central, defining feature of the endeavor [1]. These boundary-spanning efforts are
seen as improving the legitimacy of the research in the view of society at large, and as improving the
research itself by allowing research to be co-directed and the resultant knowledge to be co-produced by
both scientists and stakeholders [2,3].
However, organizational and cultural boundaries are notoriously difficult to bridge. Many attempts
as forging interdisciplinary, inter-organizational and cross-cultural collaborations fail. It is also
difficult to detect the reason why some efforts to straddle those boundaries fail while others succeed.
Do efforts aimed at improving the ability of scientists to work across such boundaries have a lasting
impact on their collaborations, or willingness to cooperate with non-scientists? Here, we take
advantage of a large collaborative sustainability science project to conduct experimental measurements
of cooperation between research faculty and citizens.
In recent decades, behavioral experiments, a staple of psychology, have been incorporated into
economics [4–6] and anthropology [7–9]. Behavioral experiments in economics have contributed to an
important theoretical debate on the validity of rational actor theory [10]. Anthropologists use
experimental methods to measure the influence of cultural variation on behavior, and argue for the
importance of culture as a primary force of individual behavior and social change [11]. The
interdisciplinary use of experimental methods seems to have enabled a new energy for synthesizing the
core insights of the traditionally segregated social sciences. Experimental methods are therefore a
valuable tool for building theoretical consensus. We argue that behavioral experiments also hold huge
potential as an applied research tool.
Economic experiments in particular have a few features that lend themselves to applied questions of
behavior within institutional settings. Economic experiments are conducted without deception, they
employ incentives, and typically participants are given a full understanding of the complete game
structure. These features, with appropriate customization of game structures and framing, allow
applied practitioners to ask the question “how do individuals behave in a simplified, known context”?
Generalized experiments such as the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game can be
used to measure individual differences in norms of altruism, sharing, and trust, respectively. These
measurements, applied appropriately within an organization, can be useful in detecting the effects of
institutional structure or changes in dimensions of social capital. Putnam [12,13] included trust,
reciprocity, the capacity for collective action, social identity and local social networks in his definition
of social capital. Cooperation in particular is also typically considered a prerequisite to collective
action, and a component of social capital. Alternatively, economic experiments can be crafted to match
a specific institutional and resource scenario, such as the irrigation systems in Thailand and Columbia [14].
In this paper we explore the use of economic experiments for applied institutional research in an
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academic setting in the former sense. We focus on a particular social change (a large research grant) in
distinct institutional setting (a research university) as a source of individual behavioral change.
1.1. Sustainability Solutions Initiative
The Sustainability Solutions Initiative (SSI) is the result of a $20 million National Science
Foundation research capacity building grant (#EPS-0904155) to the University of Maine. The SSI
conducts sustainability science research on topics relevant to the state of Maine and includes research
collaborations with ten partner institutions including many of the state’s public and private colleges
and universities. The SSI research model emphasizes an interdisciplinary approach to sustainability
research, with the majority of research teams composed of both biophysical and social scientists.
SSI research is also stakeholder driven, and researchers strive to engage relevant stakeholders to help
design the research, interpret the results, and facilitate societal solutions based upon the research
results. In summary, the grant supports five years of this sustainability-related social-ecological
systems (SESs) research to “connect knowledge with action in ways that promote strong economies,
vibrant communities, and healthy ecosystems in and beyond Maine” [15], and is composed of thirty-one
research projects organized around small teams of investigators.
Universities are uniquely poised to serve as effective “boundary organizations” [16,17]. University
projects like the SSI may have an enhanced ability to span other institutional and cultural boundaries in
a sustained fashion to forge lasting connections. Boundary organizations create opportunities for
collaboration between those in the scientific community and nonscientists [18–20]. To pursue
beneficial solutions to societal challenges the SSI encourages its researchers to actively span the
disciplinary, institutional, and cultural boundaries that often impede important partnerships. Many of
the initiative’s projects include heavy collaboration with groups outside of the university. The SSI’s
unique focus on boundary spanning renders its attempts to facilitate cross-boundary cooperation
somewhat distinct from those of the overall university community. Therefore, we consider SSI to be a
boundary organization for sustainability science.
These collaborative efforts consume considerable time and energy. Williams [21] describes
boundary spanning as a process of building relationships, which “demands an investment in time to
forge an effective working relationship and a readiness to visualize reality from the perspective of
others”. As a result, significant investments such as the NSF grant that created the SSI may be
necessary to even begin such boundary spanning ventures. The question then arises, how successful
are such major attempts at boundary spanning, and how can they be evaluated?
Efforts within the SSI to span various institutional and cultural boundaries have already been
studied [22], including the interdisciplinary boundaries between researchers [23,24], and those boundaries
that must be overcome to enable community-based research partnerships [25]. Here we apply a novel
experimental methodology to explore cooperation across key institutional and cultural boundaries.
Three major boundaries that influence the outcomes of projects such as the SSI include the
interdisciplinary boundary, the researcher–stakeholder boundary, and the town-gown boundary. These
boundaries are distinct and carry separate challenges and complexities. The interdisciplinary boundary
is well known to academics, and well-studied [26–28]. Within the SSI, faculty and doctoral students
have been forced to face their significant disciplinary differences directly, with mixed results [23].
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For SSI as for any academic research project, the interdisciplinary boundary is often the first and
sometimes the only cultural or institutional boundary that researchers encounter, and it is fundamental,
enduring, and poses considerable challenge for many research faculty [24].
A second critical boundary is that between academic researchers and stakeholders in the domains of
society that sustainability science projects must reach. The researcher–stakeholder boundary is
especially important in sustainability science and socially-engaged research projects [29]. In endeavors
such as this project, stakeholders and researchers organize around a shared problem space, establish
goals, work together to meet them, facilitating the growth of trust and increasingly efficient
collaboration [21,30]. The SSI has successfully engaged a broad range of stakeholders across the state
in problem-specific sustainability research [15].
A third boundary that is sometimes overlooked in sustainability science is that of the university
relationship with the local community. Historically the relationships between a university and its local
community, or “town and gown” cultural boundaries, have been especially difficult to bridge. Town
and gown relationships are often characterized as ones in which mistrust limits collaboration [31].
However, there are examples of universities successfully engaging in research and other collaborations
with local communities [31–34]. Silka [25] suggests that community based participatory research may
benefit from adopting the some of the approaches of sustainability science. Similarly, boundary
spanning organizations such as the SSI, in which major effort is directed toward the interdisciplinary
boundary and the researcher-stakeholder boundary may be in the best position to also improve upon
the town-gown relationship by forming, or being open to forming, researcher-citizen or project-municipal
relationships and collaborations.
An organization such as SSI has multiple collaborative boundaries to overcome, including the
disciplinary boundary, the stakeholder-researcher boundary and the town-gown boundary. Each of
these boundaries entails unique challenges [22], and may require different approaches. Nonetheless,
cooperation is a critical component of all such collaborations. This paper uses economic experiments
to explore the patterns of cooperation across the disciplinary boundary and the town-gown boundary,
to provide insight into the patterns of collaboration that emerge from university-lead sustainability
solutions projects.
1.2. Study Description and Hypotheses
We studied patterns of cooperative behavior between the three groups of interest: (I) University of
Maine faculty; (II) University of Maine faculty members who are also members of the SSI; and (III)
residents of the Bangor metropolitan region. These groups form a nested hierarchy, with the SSI at the
center, encompassed by University of Maine, itself a sub-set of the greater Bangor region population
(Figure 1). We used an economic experiment to measure cooperation between each of these groups.
We created three hypotheses that follow on the collaborative nature of the SSI enterprise. First, the
academic culture of SSI is focused on creating various types of partnerships outside the university.
Thus, we consider it reasonable that SSI faculty will be more willing to cooperate with local partners
on average than faculty from the rest of the university who have not been exposed to or supported in
pursuing research with external stakeholders. Second, on the University of Maine’s central campus,
SSI is composed of a relatively small group of some ~60 faculty who interact frequently for seminars,
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brown bags and research and business meetings. This collaboration has bred familiarity and
interdependency between these researchers. Thus we hypothesize an increased willingness of SSI
members to cooperate with each other in comparison to other groups. Finally, the SSI faces the
persistent challenge of disciplinary boundaries. Due to the differences between disciplines regarding
ontology, epistemology and ideology i.e., [35] we hypothesize that disciplines will vary in their
proclivity for cooperative research, and thus in our experimental measure of cooperation. In summary,
we hypothesize that (I) SSI faculty will cooperate more with Bangor residents than will UMaine
faculty at large; (II) SSI faculty will have the highest level of internal cooperation of any group; and
(III) that cooperation may vary due to academic training and culture in different departments.
We expand on each of these hypotheses below.
Figure 1. Nested populations form the study groups. The Sustainability Solutions Initiative
(SSI) is a small group of faculty within the University of Maine, which is itself a small part
of the greater Bangor metropolitan region.

2. Methods
Economic measurements of social capital have tended to employ derivations of the trust game [36–38],
which is asymmetrical in structure. Here, however, we aimed to measure the strength of commitment
of two potential partners toward each other in a manner that matches the symmetry in a true
mutualistic collaboration. Collaborative relationships such as those involved in University-community
partnerships or interdisciplinary collaborations are symmetrical in nature. Because the trust game is
asymmetrical, we instead used a public goods game to measure cooperation symmetrically.
We employed a dyadic, one-shot, asynchronous public goods game to measure cooperation between
the three nested populations. These economic experiments are very general in nature, and do not
simulate the details of an actual collaborative endeavor. Instead, these games provide a simple
measurement of cooperation as an indication of the likelihood of successful collaboration between two
participants in a general sense. Each participant played one game with an anonymous randomly
selected member of each of the three populations. The identity of game partners was also unknown to
both the participants and the experimenters at the time of data collection. Six experimenters conducted
a total of 600 games, three for each of exactly 200 individuals. We sampled 41 SSI faculty
(constituting a 75% sample), 81 University of Maine faculty (~12% sample), and 78 Bangor residents
(~0.23% sample).
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Participation differed between faculty and Bangor resident populations out of necessity. Faculty
members were interviewed on campus over a period of many weeks, while Bangor residents were
interviewed at a central location over two days. Faculty were invited to participate first by email, then
by follow-up phone calls, and individual sessions were scheduled with those who agreed to an
interview. Sessions were held in a private location, most commonly faculty offices. At the time of
implementation there were 55 SSI faculty, excluding four involved in or aware of this project. All 55
were contacted, and 41 participated. The same procedure was used for a sample of non-SSI faculty
selected randomly from a global list of nearly 700 UMaine faculty, of which 81 participated.
Bangor area residents were selected at random from the Bangor telephone book and called with an
invitation to participate. This method produced a lower yield than with faculty, so flyers were posted at
locations of high pedestrian traffic in Bangor, and the experiment was posted on craigslist.org. The
games were played at a public location (Bangor Parks and Recreation building) in downtown Bangor
over the course of two weekend days. A total of 78 residents participated. Bangor participants sat in a
waiting room from which they were escorted to private stations in a separate room where the interview
was conducted, and finally to a payment station.
Experimenters followed a script, and data were collected using touchscreen tablets to minimize
human error. After cueing participants to read the informed consent notice on the tablet, experimenters
retrieved the tablet, explained the game in detail and quizzed the participants about game mechanics in
eight different situations. The number of errors was recorded. We did not provide any further
information than the names of the groups participating—the participants cooperated based only on
their previous knowledge of SSI, UMaine, and Bangor. Participants were then presented the three
games in random order, for each of which they selected their single voluntary contribution.
Each of the three public goods games proceeded as follows. Participants selected a partner group
from a hat, and the experimenter enabled that experiment and handed the tablet to the participant.
Players then chose the amount for contribution to the common fund out of a ten-dollar endowment for
each game. For each game, the common fund was then multiplied by a factor of 1.5 and divided by
two; this amount was distributed to the two players. Participants then selected one group from the hat
for which they were not paid, and were paid for the remaining two games. Bangor participants were
paid immediately, faculty participants were paid upon the completion of data collection. A brief
questionnaire followed the contribution choices.
After data collection was complete, random matches were made between players in all three groups.
Because the samples were asymmetrical, random matches were made until all every participant had at
least one match, and some participants in the smaller groups had two matches. Participants in all
groups were paid only for their first random match.
3. Results and Discussion
As described previously, each participant in the experiment was asked to make a contribution to
three different players, one from each of the three nested participant groups. This experimental design
allows us to examine the ways in which these contributions might differ when the only information the
participant receives is the group affiliation of the other player. The following analysis is designed to
examine whether: (I) SSI participants are more generous toward Bangor partners than are UMaine
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participants; (II) own-group preferences exist; and (III) SSI participant contributions differ across the
academic discipline of the participant.
We start by presenting some descriptive and comparative statistics and then present the results of
regression analysis. Table 1 presents mean contribution by each participant group to each of the three
partner groups. An analysis of variance in contributions by donor groups reveals that only 7.4% of the
variation was between groups, and demonstrating that when responses are pooled, there is no
significant difference between groups (F = 0.202, p = 0.895). A second pooled ANOVA in
contributions by recipient group found that only 15% of the variation was between groups, and failed
to reject the traditional null hypothesis of no difference between group means (F = 0.434, p = 0.728) in the
pooled dataset.
Table 1. Mean contributions of donors to dyadic public goods game by partner in US
dollars. Contributions from two matched participants were invested in a shared fund, which
grew in value and was then split evenly between the two participants.
Donor
Bangor
SSI
UMaine

N
78
41
81

Bangor
7.05
6.15
6.43

Partner
SSI
6.51
7.27
7.28

UMaine
6.92
6.95
6.74

These preliminary results beg the question of how cooperative contributions respond to treatment
and control variables when recipient and donor are included. We employed multiple regression models
to address our three hypotheses.
3.1. Control Variables
Control variables used in the models are based upon prior research demonstrating their significance
in predicting contributions in cooperative games. Male gender (MALE) is used as a control variable
because gender has often been found to influence behavior in public goods [39,40] and related
experiments [41,42]. Strong identification with the partner group (STRONGID) is included because it
can have a positive effect on contributions. STRONGID is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1
when participants answered the “How strongly do you identify yourself with (Bangor/SSI/UMaine)”?
question as 4 or greater on a Likert scale of 1–5. If participants strongly identify with groups other than
their own, then the difference between own group and other group contributions will be affected.
Controlling for strong identification allows for the isolation of the group effect. Contributions are also
likely to be affected by baseline individual differences in trust. For this reason, the variable TRUST is
used as a control. This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 when participants answered all of the
following three questions as 4 or greater on a Likert scale of 1–5: “How likely are you to trust a person
of the following types? (1) Someone I know personally, (2) Someone with similar beliefs and values as
myself, (3) Someone with compatible economic interests”. The TRUST variable is expected to be
positively correlated with contributions to partners.
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3.2. Education and Income
Ideally, income or education variables would also be used as control variables, but these variables
are too highly correlated with group membership in this sample. As well, education and income do not
possess sufficient variation particularly when examining contributions made by SSI and UMaine
participants, who, as faculty members, have all attained at least a graduate degree. Income differs
across groups defined by Bangor group participant status as compared with the two faculty groups
together (Chi-square = 51.548, p = 0.000). This is problematic for regression models due to
collinearity between the dummy variable, BANGOR, and the income classes. Income is a categorical
data series in this study. Education levels are also collinear with BANGOR, with education levels
significantly lower for Bangor resident participants than for faculty. There is also evidence that at least
one of the education code groups has a different income distribution (Chi-square = 50.776, p = 0.000),
suggesting that there is likely collinearity between income and education level. While education and
income variables are therefore omitted in the formal analysis, we return to them in the discussion
and conclusion.
3.3. Models
We used two distinct types of regression to address our hypotheses. First, we used tobit model with
a lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 10 to address the truncated dependent variable; participants were
only able to contribute whole dollar amounts between $0 and $10. We also used an ordered probit
model in which the contributions were categorized into three labeled groups: less than $5 (free-rider),
exactly $5 (egalitarian), and greater than $5 (cooperator). This model type was chosen because the
difference between contributions of 2 and 3 dollars, for example, are not thought to have the same
meaning as the difference between contributions of 5 and 6 dollars. These categories are perhaps more
meaningful in terms of measuring the salient psychological cues that govern cooperative tendencies.
For each hypothesis we implemented regressions with and without the hypothesized explanatory
variables for both types of model. All models employ all three control variables, MALE, STRONGID,
and TRUST. Tobit and ordered probit results are qualitatively similar. We report tobit model results in
the main text, and provide full model specifications and regression results for both model families in
the appendix.
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Boundary Spanning—Project Faculty Will Cooperate More with Bangor
Residents than Other Faculty
To explain contributions to Bangor partners, we formulated models in which the dependent variable
is contributions to Bangor partners (CONTRIBBGR). One set of models pools observations from all
three participant types, and a second set of models adds dummy variables for SSI and UMAINE
participants. For example, we present the two tobit regression models used in hypothesis 1, below.
All subsequent analyses are constructed in a similar fashion. We expected that SSI participants would
cooperate more with Bangor residents than would UMaine faculty in general.
(1)
Contrib = β + β MALE + β STRONGID + β TRUST + ϵ
0

1

2

3
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3.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Group Cooperation—Project Faculty Will Have the Highest Level of Internal
Cooperation of Any Group
We explored this hypothesis by first seeking to understand whether or not participants hold a
preference group-centric cooperation demonstrated by higher contributions to fellow group members
than to members of other groups. We follow the same procedure we used for hypothesis 1 save that
here we use three different dependent variables, one for each participant type, making for a total of
6 models. These models are implemented by restricting the sample to a single group of participants at a
time. We run the pair of models once using only the 93 observations derived from SSI participants in
order to determine whether or not SSI participants act more favorably towards SSI partners than they
do towards UMaine or Bangor partners. They are then run again using the observations from only the
UMaine participants and, subsequently, Bangor participants. We compare the resulting regression for
each model set to determine whether there is a significant difference between contributions based upon
partner group. This is accomplished through inclusion of two of three dummy variables,
SSIPARTNER, UMPARTNER, and BGRPARTNER, depending upon which group is being
examined. The donor participant is always designated as intercept category. We hypothesized
participants of all types will prefer to cooperate with their peers of the same group, and that SSI
participants would demonstrate the highest level of in-group cooperation.
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Disciplines—Contributions Will Differ by Academic Discipline within the Project
Our final question centers on the influence of academic discipline, broadly defined, on SSI
participants’ contributions to partners. The models used here to explore the relationship between
academic discipline and contributions are similar to those used to examine own-group preference in
hypothesis 2. Analyses were constructed to match the prior two hypotheses, with two model variants in
which the hypothetical variables are either pooled or broken into dummy variables for each of the
academic discipline groups. The discipline groups are social science, physical science and biological
science, and are denoted with the variables SOCSCI (n = 11), PHYSCI (n = 5), and BIOSCI (n = 13),
respectively. Finally, we a fourth dummy, OTHDISC, for those disciplines that do not fit in our simple
typology. The variable SOCSCI (n = 2) is used as the intercept case, and the sample is restricted to SSI
participants. We predicted that cooperative contributions will vary by academic discipline within SSI,
but we do not have any further priors about such variation.
4. Results
Our results diverged from the hypothetical predictions in interesting ways. With regards to the first
hypothesis, we found no significant difference in contributions to Bangor partners between SSI and
UMaine participants. Second, we find evidence that the identity of one’s own group influences
cooperative partner preferences differently across our study populations. We did not find evidence that
SSI participants contributed more to their own group than UMaine partners. However, our models
suggest SSI participants were less likely to be cooperators when interacting with Bangor partners than
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when interacting with their own group. However, that effect did not emerge in both tobit and probit
model families. Surprisingly, however, the models suggest that for UMaine participants, there is a
preference for cooperating with SSI partners over one’s own group. Meanwhile, we find no evidence
that Bangor participants exhibit any cooperative preference across their partner populations. Lastly, we
find the strongest evidence for disciplinary influences on cooperation. Physical scientists amongst the
SSI faculty tend to be less cooperative within this experiment, as evaluated across all four models.
In addition, having a Bangor partner also decreases the probability of a contributing generously, for all
disciplinary categories in SSI. Below we summarize the results of the regression analysis, and we
present the full detail in the appendix.
4.1. Hypothesis 1: Boundary Spanning—Project Faculty Will Cooperate More with Bangor Residents
than Other Faculty
The first set of models sought to determine whether there was a significant difference between
contributions made by SSI participants and UMaine participants when giving to Bangor partners.
We find no significant difference between contributions to Bangor partners made by SSI participants
and those made by UMaine participants, for either tobit or probit variations. See the appendix for
model specifications and regression tables.
4.2. Hypothesis 2: Group Cooperation—Project Faculty Will Have the Highest Level of Internal
Cooperation of Any Group
Our next question addresses how own-group cooperation compares across groups. The preliminary
ANOVA showed no differences across groups by donor or recipient. Against this background, we
focus on whether or not participants in a given group demonstrate in-group cooperative preferences in
comparison to those with other groups. As explained in the analysis section, models were run for all
three participant types separately. The full results of all 12 regressions are presented in the appendix.
First, we examine contributions made by SSI participants. The probit model suggests the existence
of possible own-group preference. In this model, giving to a Bangor partner is associated with a lower
probability of making a contribution with a value that falls within the highest category. This means that
SSI participants are less likely to be cooperators when interacting with Bangor partners than when
interacting with their own group. The same effect was not found when SSI contributions to UMaine
partners were considered. However, this effect was small (–0.529) and only significant at the 90%
confidence level.
When we use observations from UMaine participants, we found no evidence for own-group
preference in either tobit or probit variants. However, we did find mild evidence in the tobit model that
UMaine participants prefer to cooperate more with SSI partners than with other UMaine faculty.
UMaine participants tended to contribute $2 more to SSI participants than to other UMaine faculty, at
the 90% confidence level. This set of models also finds significance in both MALE and TRUST
variables. As expected, the signs of these coefficients are negative and positive, respectively.
We also ran the same model to determine whether an own-group preference exists for Bangor
participants. No significant evidence was found to support any partner group effect for Bangor
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participants. These models do not find any significant difference between partner groups when
focusing solely on Bangor participants.
4.3. Hypothesis 3: Discipline—Contributions Will Differ by Academic Discipline within the Project
Finally, we tested if the type of academic discipline of SSI faculty members has any relationship
with contributions to partners. Both families of models provide support for our hypothesis that
contributions in the public goods game will vary according to academic discipline. We find that SSI
faculty members who are physical scientists tend to be less cooperative within the context of this
experiment. Estimates from the tobit model suggest that those in the physical sciences tend to
contribute as much as $3 less on average than social scientists. This effect is found in all four models
at the 95% and 90% confidence levels for tobit and probit models respectively. In addition, having a
Bangor partner also decreases the probability of a contributing generously within the SSI population.
Both the tobit and the ordered probit models find significance in the BGRPARTNER variable.
The results of the disciplinary analysis are detailed in Table 2.
Table 2. Tobit regression show that academic discipline influences contributions made by
SSI participants.

Constant
Male
Trust
Strong Identification
with Partner Group

Base model

Disciplines

6.831 ***
(1.226)
1.493
(1.124)
0.718
(1.102)
0.129
(1.063)

7.661 ***
(1.517)
1.412
(1.110)
0.651
(1.103)
−0.100
(1.048)
−2.958 **
(1.493)
−0.626
(1.177)
1.815
(2.315)

−190.767
93

−187.900
93

Physical Sciences
Biological Sciences
Other Discipline
Bangor
UMaine
Log likelihood
No. Observations

Disciplines&
Partners
9.121 ***
(1.745)
1.292
(1.102)
0.673
(1.087)
−0.680
(1.255)
−3.056 **
(1.478)
−0.708
(1.168)
1.697
(2.281)
−2.128 *
(1.274)
−0.897
(1.303)
−186.496
93

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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5. Conclusions
We did not find strong evidence for two of our three hypotheses. We hypothesized that SSI players
would contribute more to Bangor partners than would UMaine faculty in general because SSI faculty
have had significant exposure to the concepts of boundary spanning, citizen-scientist collaboration,
and cooperative stakeholder partnerships. Contrary to predictions, UMaine and SSI players cooperated
with Bangor partners about equally. There are a number of ways to view this result, with hopeful and
pessimistic overtones for the success of sustainability science projects. On the one hand, the results
show no effect of participation in the sustainability project. But we do not believe that a lack of
difference signals that the SSI organization has not enhanced the ability of its researchers to cooperate
across institutional boundaries. To the contrary, SSI researchers have had developed significant
ongoing collaborative partnerships with industry, municipal government, state government, non-profit
organizations, primary schools, and other academic institutions, many of which would not have
materialized without the organizational energy and funding that SSI provides. Thus, one explanation is
that researcher–stakeholder partnerships are difficult to establish, develop only over a period of many
years, require significant investments of energy and time to maintain. Moreover, Hutchins et al. [43]
suggests that interest in developing community-university partnerships is in part a function of the
helpfulness, institutional proximity, familiarity and levels of trust one has with a potential collaborator.
In this sense, our measurement is imperfect because it does not measure collaborations made or in the
making, but rather hypothetical relationships with anonymous partners. Unfortunately, logistical
complexities made measuring cooperation with current SSI stakeholders impractical. The one-shot
measurement of cooperation is necessarily artificial, and could be missing the effect of real behavioral
change regarding cooperative research partnerships. However, it seems unlikely that the experiment
does not measure some related tendency for initiating cooperation.
We suspect instead that the primary reason that SSI and UMaine players both contribute about the
same amount to Bangor partners rather that the faculty at the land grant university are already willing
to engage and cooperate with local citizens, as indeed they already have. Viewed in this way, the lack
of difference suggests that the university may already be achieving some amount of the outreach that
leading sustainability scientists call for [44,45], or at least researchers may be willing to do
initiate such cooperative ventures. Perhaps, then land-grant universities present fertile ground for
researcher–stakeholder collaborations in sustainability science. We conclude that the bar for successful
cooperative researcher–stakeholder partnerships is very high indeed, and that efforts such as the SSI
do not so much change faculty interest or willingness to collaborate with citizens as it does their ability
to do so.
We also hypothesized an own-group cooperation bias such that SSI players would be more
cooperative with other SSI players than with players form other groups. However, we did not find a
strong pattern of own-group bias across any of our groups. To the contrary, the UMaine faculty tended
to contribute more to SSI than to other UMaine faculty. However, SSI players did contribute more to
other SSI players than to Bangor players. This might be a result of diffusion in the strength of group
identity with population size. As the SSI is the smallest group, members simply interact more with
each other than do those of UMaine faculty in general. Likewise, SSI and UMaine faculty share
institutional environments while Bangor residents may share very little with each other.
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Finally, we found strong evidence for our third hypothesis, that disciplinary differences may
influence our measure of generalized cooperation. Within the SSI, physical scientists contribute less
than other disciplinary categories across four distinct regression formulations. This difference is
intriguing, and suggests that social and physical scientists may have a markedly different academic
culture, with physical scientists being less inclined to short-term collaboration. Academics are likely
conditioned by their disciplinary environments to have different expectations around collaboration.
It is well known that many humanities some social sciences tend towards single-author publications,
while a large fraction of the natural sciences commonly produce mostly multiple authored
publications. A similar pattern could hold true for the collaborations that precede publication. This,
in turn, could be due to the nature of their work. Project durations, funding patterns, and required
people-hours for minimal research completion may influence the structure of successful collaborations in
each field, and as a result the inclinations of researchers to even approach collaboration when the
opportunity arises. Importantly, we do not consider this disciplinary difference to be an indictment of
cooperation in the physical sciences at the University of Maine or within the SSI. Instead, we consider
this a measure of a cultural difference that should be explored in the course of establishing strong
interdisciplinary collaborations, as SSI continues to do.
This study demonstrates that simple experimental economic games measuring foundational
dimensions of prosociality and social capital such as trust, cooperation, and reciprocity can be useful in
measuring and diagnosing behavioral patterns within institutional settings for applied research, and can
reveal unexpected results. With refinement, experimental economic games of this sort could be used to
diagnose institutional performance and help to guide institutional design by directly assessing
fundamental social outcomes. In the ideal context institutional design experiments could be conducted
with such measures in mind, and outcomes evaluated via randomized controlled trials. There are,
however, notable limitations in implementing behavioral experiments within an organization of limited
size. One such limitation is the “small world” effect in small organizations in which the participants
may be too socially proximate to the researchers themselves, and their behavior influenced by
foreknowledge of the questions, methods or intentionality of the evaluators. Another limitation of these
methods is the potential for the spread of negative impressions of embedded evaluators. Additionally,
those seeking to employ experimental economics games as applied measures of institutional efficacy
face additional challenges. One challenge is in how to tailor existing games to institutional structure
while maintaining comparability with the literature. Another challenge is the importance of
maintaining and building trust, even while measuring it, or related variables.
Despite these limitations and challenges, we believe that simple experimental economic games such
as the public goods, dictator, ultimatum, and trust games have great potential in evaluating behavior
within and between organizations and for improving institutional efficacy. This insight should be of
particular interest to sustainability science efforts in which the need to bridge institutional and cultural
boundaries is given such emphasis.
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Appendix
Complete Model Specifications and Results
We constructed tobit and ordered probit models for each hypothesis, and compared models that
include and exclude the variables of interest. Results that appear consistent across both types of model
are given the highest level of certainty. Here we present all model specifications for each hypothesis
followed by regression results. The dependent variable Contrib is associated with the continuous but
truncated tobit regression models, and ContribCat with the ordered probit models which employ an
ordered, categorized dependent variable. Interpretation is provided in the main text.
Hypothesis 1: When partnered with Bangor participants, SSI participants will cooperate more than
will UMaine participants.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
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Table A1. Explaining contributions to Bangor partners—Models 1.1–1.4.

Dependent Variable
Constant
Male
Trust
Strong
Identification with
Partner Group

Model 1.1

Model 1.2

7.547 ***
(0.904)
−0.038
(0.763)
0.719
(0.768)

Model 1.3
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.021 ***
(0.200)
−0.309 *
(0.186)
0.191
(0.186)

Model 1.4
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.090 ***
(0.232)
−0.300
(0.187)
0.196
(0.186)

Contribution
(tobit)

Contribution
(tobit)

7.034 ***
(0.769)
−0.105
(0.762)
0.672
(0.769)
1.149
(0.732)

0.944
(0.758)

0.240
(0.175)

0.214
(0.182)

−390.477

−0.750
(1.059)
−0.873
(0.808)
−389.852

−181.516

−0.090
(0.251)
−0.120
(0.194)
−181.319

−184.971

−184.971

0.075 **
0.939
(0.108)
184

0.199
0.939
(0.108)
184

SSI Partner
UMaine Partner
Log likelihood
Restricted log
likelihood
Significance level
Mu(01)
No. Observations

184

184

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals will cooperate preferentially with their own groups.
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Models 2.1–2.4 are run separately for all three groups of participants, and are summarized in
Tables A2–A4.
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Table A2. Exploring own-group preference in SSI participants—Models 2.1–2.4.

Dependent Variable
Constant
Male
Trust
Strong
Identification with
Partner Group

Model 2.1

Model 2.2

8.167 ***
(1.489)
1.415
(1.117)
0.738
(1.089)

Model 2.3
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.035 ***
(0.317)
0.403
(0.264)
0.091
(0.260)

Model 2.4
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.408 ***
(0.392)
0.369
(0.266)
0.099
(0.262)

Contribution
(tobit)

Contribution
(tobit)

6.831 ***
(1.226)
1.493
(1.124)
0.718
(1.102)
0.129
(1.063)

−0.314
(1.264)

0.083
(0.251)

−0.132
(0.304)

−190.767

−2.054
(1.319)
−1.076
(1.347)
−189.521

−82.859

−0.529 *
(0.319)
−0.082
(0.325)
−81.391

−84.047

−84.047

0.498
1.231 ***
(0.188)
93

0.379
1.258 ***
(0.192)
93

Bangor Partner
UMaine Partner
Log likelihood
Restricted log
likelihood
Significance level
Mu(01)
Observations

93

93

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.

Table A3. Exploring own-group preference in UMaine participants—Models 2.1–2.4.

Dependent Variable
Constant
Male
Trust
Strong
Identification with
Partner Group
Bangor Partner

Model 2.1

Model 2.2

6.073 ***
(1.312)
−0.003
(0.854)
2.144 **
(0.833)

Model 2.3
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.107 ***
(0.198)
−0.314 *
(0.182)
0.563 ***
(0.177)

Model 2.4
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.030 ***
(0.282)
−0.311 *
(0.183)
0.575 ***
(0.178)

Contribution
(tobit)

Contribution
(tobit)

7.248 ***
(0.892)
−0.008
(0.861)
2.099 **
(0.840)
0.254
(0.777)

1.150
(0.987)

0.068
(0.159)

0.159
(0.202)

0.209
(1.059)

−0.136
(0.218)
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Table A3. Cont.
Model 2.1

SSI Partner
Log likelihood
Restricted log
likelihood
Significance level

−462.113

Model 2.2
2.022*
(1.204)
−460.041

Mu(01)
Observations

225

225

Model 2.3

−210.337

Model 2.4
0.266
(0.247)
−208.309

−217.984

−217.984

0.002
0.950 ***
(0.102)
225

0.002
0.961 ***
(0.103)
225

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.

Table A4. Exploring own-group preference in Bangor participants—Models 2.1–2.4.

Dependent Variable
Constant
Male
Trust
Strong Identification
with Partner Group

Model 2.1

Model 2.2

Contribution
(tobit)

Contribution
(tobit)

7.624 ***
(0.665)
0.310
(0.731)
0.190
(0.781)
0.784
(0.796)

7.963 ***
(0.956)
0.292
(0.730)
0.240
(0.784)
0.476
(0.911)
−0.748
(0.998)
−0.009
(0.926)
−488.069

SSI Partner
UMaine Partner
Log likelihood
Restricted log
likelihood
Significance level

−488.480

Model 2.4
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.042 ***
(0.217)
−0.263
(0.161)
−0.103
(0.171)
0.081
(0.198)
−0.054
(0.216)
−0.263
(0.161)
−226.241
−227.911

Mu(01)
Observations

Model 2.3
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.007 ***
(0.158)
−0.261
(0.161)
−0.109
(0.170)
0.104
(0.174)

234

234

0.651 ***
(0.081)
234

0.648
0.652 ***
(0.081)
234

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.

Hypothesis 3: SSI participant contributions will differ by academic discipline.
(11)
(12)
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(13)
(14)

Table A5. Correlations between academic discipline and contributions made by SSI participants.

Dependent Variable
Constant
Male
Trust
Strong Identification
with Partner Group
Physical Sciences
Biological Sciences
Other Discipline

Model 3.1

Model 3.2

Contribution
(tobit)

Contribution
(tobit)

7.661 ***
(1.517)
1.412
(1.110)
0.651
(1.103)
−0.100
(1.048)
−2.958 **
(1.493)
–0.626
(1.177)
1.815
(2.315)

9.121 ***
(1.745)
1.292
(1.102)
0.673
(1.087)
−0.680
(1.255)
−3.056 **
(1.478)
−0.708
(1.168)
1.697
(2.281)
−2.128 *
(1.274)
−0.897
(1.303)
−186.496

Bangor
UMaine
Log likelihood
Restricted log likelihood
Significance level

−187.900

Mu(01)
Observations

93

93

Model 3.3
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.204 ***
(0.403)
0.386
(0.273)
0.057
(0.272)
0.047
(0.260)
−0.641 *
(0.361)
−0.014
(0.293)
0.489
(0.619)

−80.229
−84.047
0.266
1.263 ***
(0.191)
93

Model 3.4
Contribution
category
(ordered probit)
1.666 ***
(0.479)
0.338
(0.276)
0.066
(0.275)
−0.213
(0.320)
−0.717 *
(0.367)
−0.069
(0.298)
0.452
(0.630)
−0.578 *
(0.324)
−0.062
(0.332)
−78.498
−84.047
0.196
1.296 ***
93

*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.
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